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Abstract— In smart electricity grids, high time granu-
larity (HTG) power consumption data can be decomposed
into individual appliance load signatures via Non-Intrusive
Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) techniques to expose
appliance usage profiles. Various methods ranging from
load shaping to noise addition and data aggregation have
been proposed to mitigate this problem. However, with
the growing scarcity of natural resources, utilities other
than electricity (such as water and natural gas) have
also begun to be subject to HTG metering, which creates
privacy issues similar to that of electricity. Therefore,
employing privacy protection countermeasures for only
electricity usage is ineffective for appliances that utilize
additional/other metered resources. As such, existing pri-
vacy countermeasures and metrics need to be reevaluated
to address not only electricity, but also any other resource
that is metered. Furthermore, a holistic privacy protection
approach for all metered resources must be adopted as
the information leak from any of the resources has a
potential to render the privacy preserving countermeasures
for all the other resources futile. This paper introduces the
privacy preservation problem for multiple HTG metered
resources and explores potential solutions for its mitiga-
tion.
Index Terms—IoT, non-intrusive appliance load moni-
toring, privacy, smart metering, smart natural gas meter-
ing, smart water metering
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART Grid (SG) concept has emerged as the tra-ditional power grid could no longer address the
contemporary needs of Utility Companies (UCs) and
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consumers. Smart metering is one of the fundamental
enabling technologies of SG which describes the de-
ployment of electric meters and associated infrastructure
facilitating two-way communications between meters
and the central system. Indeed, smart metering is an
integral part of the Internet-of-Things (IoT).
High time granularity (HTG) smart metering enables
minutely metering of the electricity usage of consumers
and this data can be used to better manage the grid
and also to provide accurate and personalized billing
services. However, the frequent metering of electricity
usage brought along privacy concerns, since there are
a variety of Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring
(NIALM) methods which can be employed to infer
individual appliance usages from the metered energy
utilization of the consumer [1]. As the natural resources
are becoming more and more scarce, within the umbrella
term of next generation smart home, resources other than
electricity have also become subject to HTG smart me-
tering (see Fig. 1). The total number of HTG electricity,
gas, and water meters is expected to continue surging
(more than 200 million to be deployed only in 2024 [2])
along with the privacy concerns associated with it.
Fig. 1. Residential smart electricity, water, and gas metering.
The term NIALM has emerged in 1980s and since
then it has been a generic descriptor for methods and
techniques that identify appliance load signatures from
the aggregate metered load data of a residential (e.g.,
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
13
36
3v
2 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  1
8 A
ug
 20
20
2a house) or commercial (e.g., a factory) electricity
consumer. Since these methods can infer individual
appliance loads from the overall metered load of a
consumer, there is no need to put sensors or meters inside
the house/workplace, hence, the term "nonintrusive" is
being used. To render NIALM methods ineffective, many
countermeasures have been proposed in the literature,
each having their own advantages and shortcomings.
These methods can be broadly categorized into five: data
obfuscation, aggregation, anonymization, downsampling,
and load shaping, which are further explained in Sec-
tion III.
Each of these methods adopts a different approach
to address the privacy preservation in SGs to counter
NIALM against electricity utilization. However, recent
developments in HTG metering of other resources such
as water and natural gas bring their own privacy issues.
Furthermore, information leakage from any resource
can undermine the effectiveness of the countermeasures
adopted for other resources.
The literature on privacy threats and countermeasures
against them within the context of smart metering is
limited to electricity metering only. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no study that focuses on privacy
issues in smart metering of water and gas. Furthermore,
we are not aware of any previous investigation on holistic
privacy preservation for electricity, gas, and water meter-
ing. One of the reasons for such a gap is that HTG water
and gas metering are rather recent trends unlike HTG
electricity metering which is more widespread and rather
a mature technology. Nevertheless, there is a growing
issue of privacy for water and natural gas metering which
will not only pose a serious problem just as SG privacy
did for a while now, but also renders current techniques
ineffective because hiding only electricity usage will
not be enough to hide the usage of appliances that
use electricity and, at least, one of the other resources
(see Fig. 2). This study explores the emerging problem
of privacy preservation for the next generation smart
homes with multiple smart metered resources. Our novel
contributions are summarized as follows:
• We justify the need for privacy protection in water
and gas utilization by reviewing deployments of
HTG smart water and gas metering and NIALM
techniques designed specifically for them.
• We review the existing privacy protection tech-
niques for HTG electricity metering and demon-
strate how these methods can be adapted to HTG
water and gas metering.
• We introduce the concept of holistic privacy for
smart homes utilizing HTG smart metered electric-
ity, gas, and water.
Fig. 2. Appliances that use multiple resources (such as washing
machines) leave traces on multiple smart meters.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II
overviews smart metering and NIALM techniques uti-
lized for metered water and gas. In Section III, adapta-
tions of privacy preserving methods employed in SG to
metered water and gas are provided. In Section IV, the
concept of holistic privacy is introduced and elaborated.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
II. SMART RESOURCE METERING
Utilization of resources such as electricity, water, and
gas has been increasing in proportion to the grow-
ing global economy. As these resources are inherently
limited, efficient consumption of them has become a
priority for sustainable growth. Smart metering is used
to facilitate this efficiency. Smart electricity metering
and its privacy issues have been studied widely in
the literature [1–4]. However, there are also significant
advancements on smart water and gas meters with high
precision and high frequency metering capabilities. We
overview smart metering technology, deployment status,
and NIALM for gas and water in the rest of this section.
A. Smart Metering Technology
Traditional water meters have low measurement pre-
cision and low time granularity when compared to the
modern smart metering. Indeed, typically, water con-
sumption is measured in terms of m3 or ft3, while the
most frequent readings are done manually once in a
month, coinciding with the billing period. Currently,
water meters with built-in Advanced Metering Infras-
tructure (AMI) support for automatic collection of water
usage data are available. This gives UCs the opportunity
to monitor water usage much more frequently.
While it is possible for the UCs to shorten the read-
ing period arbitrarily using current smart water meters,
3increasing the measurement precision requires adoption
of alternative technologies. There are several sensors that
promise various sampling frequencies and metering reso-
lutions [5–7]. Flow meters support a metering frequency
up to 1 Hz and resolution of 0.014 liters. Pressure sensors
can have a metering frequency of 2 kHz. Accelerometers
can measure the water usage up to 100 Hz and have a
resolution of 0.015 liters. The most precise metering can
be achieved by using ultrasonic sensors with sampling
frequency of up to 2 MHz and a resolution of 1.8 ml.
Measuring gas is inherently more difficult than mea-
suring water, because its volume depends on the instan-
taneous temperature and pressure. Nonetheless, there are
several studies regarding HTG smart gas metering [8,9].
Traditional gas meters such as diaphragm and rotary
meters use positive displacement for measurement and
have a resolution of a few ft3 with accuracy up to
0.25-1%. By utilizing a special setup with a high-
resolution encoder, their resolution can be increased to
0.005 ft3 [8]. Velocity meters such as turbine gas meters
can perform measurements up to 1 kHz and provide
accuracy of 0.5-1%. Differential pressure meters such
as orifice gas meters can have the accuracy of 0.25-2%.
Other technologies such as ultrasonic flow meters and
Coriolis meters promise even higher accuracy levels [3].
NIALM methods are effective when the metering is
frequent enough to capture the ON/OFF events of the
appliances. For example, if metering is done every 10
minutes then an appliance with a runtime of 5 min-
utes can, potentially, be invisible to NIALM methods.
However, aforementioned water and natural gas sensors
have metering frequencies that are higher than 1 Hz.
Therefore, it is possible to capture the ON/OFF events
of all conventional water/gas end-uses/appliances. Sim-
ilarly, for NIALM methods to detect an appliance, the
resolution of the meters should be smaller than the the
appliance’s consumption during one metering period.
For example, if water is measured every minute and an
appliance uses 1 liter of water in a minute, the water
meter’s resolution should be less than 1 liter in order
to accurately detect the ON/OFF event of the appliance.
Nevertheless, resolutions of the state-of-the-art water and
gas sensors are more than enough for detecting domestic
end-uses/appliances.
B. Smart Meter Deployment
Although overlooked by many due to their slow
progress compared to the deployment of smart electricity
meters, smart water and natural gas meters are being
deployed all around the world, especially in developed
countries and areas. The increasing scarcity of natural
resources gives rise to the speed of the progress.
Smart natural gas meters are replacing the legacy ones
in most of the developed countries and the emerging
economies. The UK recently started to install smart
gas meters to reach, eventually, more than 30 million
residences. Italy plans to deploy smart gas meters to
100% of the households by the end of 2020 [10].
Smart water meters, on the other hand, are being
deployed throughout the globe where financing such
a great investment is possible and, especially, in the
countries where clean water resources are scarce, such as
Australia, New Zealand, India, and South Africa among
others. The number of smart water meters installed
worldwide is expected to reach 400 million by 2026 [6].
C. Nonintrusive Appliance Monitoring
High granularity water metering data facilitates the
disaggregation of a household’s total water usage into
individual appliances or end-use categories. Algorithms
that are proposed in the literature use machine learning
methods such as decision trees or clustering to differ-
entiate the appliances [6]. These algorithms use specific
properties of the appliances such as volume, rate, dura-
tion, and pressure of the water flow for identification.
Methods for disaggregating natural gas data range
from time series disaggregation [11] to fuzzy c-means
clustering [12] and edge detection [13]. From aggregated
data, these methods can infer the appliance usage and
can profile the consumers in terms of their headcount,
employment status, social class, and annual income [12].
III. PRIVACY PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES FOR
SMART METERED RESOURCES
Since the literature on privacy protection for smart
water and gas metering is non-existent at the moment,
in this section, we present the aforementioned privacy
preservation methods proposed for HTG electricity me-
tering and make a first attempt on how (and if) they can
be adapted for smart water and gas metering.
A. Data Obfuscation
In smart grids, obfuscation methods add noise to the
metered consumption data to hide appliance signatures.
Some of these methods utilize a rechargeable battery
to create noise in the metered data. The charging and
discharging times of the battery is scheduled meticu-
lously so that the differences in the power usage levels
of different time slots do not leak relevant information.
A similar technique can be used for hiding water
and gas usage profiles by employing storage tanks.
Alternatively, the energy obtained from natural gas can
4be stored in the form of heated water in a hot water tank
to obfuscate both the metered water and metered gas.
This can be considered as a more secure way instead of
storing a flammable substance in a household.
B. Data Aggregation
Aggregation methods combine the metering data of
multiple customers and encrypt them, so that the me-
tering information cannot be used by adversaries. More-
over, privacy-enhancing cryptographic methods such as
homomorphic encryption are commonly employed for
flexibility. Indeed, homomorphic encryption methods en-
able UCs to do certain calculations on the measured data
without needing to decrypt it.
A similar approach can easily be adopted for water and
gas metering. Data from electricity, water, and gas meters
can also be encrypted together in cases where these
services are provided by the same UC. The downside
of such methods is that a trusted third party or the UC
have to be trusted with the original data.
C. Anonymization
Data anonymization methods utilize a pseudonym or
an ID that cannot be linked to the consumer rather
than the consumer’s real-life information to protect the
consumer’s privacy. However, this does not stop an
adversary who has physical access to the feeder cable
of a house from obtaining the aggregate data and dis-
aggregating it to infer private information. In fact, with
the advancements in Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems
(MEMS) and sensor equipment, measuring water and
natural gas from outside a house has become as easy
as measuring electricity. Therefore, anonymization can
be coupled with other privacy-enhancing methods to be
more effective, however, it is not a fail-proof strategy.
D. Downsampling
Smart meters generally send the time averaged value
of consumption within each sampling period to the
UCs. Therefore, as the sampling frequency of a smart
meter decreases, some appliances start and finish their
operations within the same sampling period. Since most
of the NIALM methods look for edges in the metered
data for detecting on/off events, appliances with short
operation durations can be missed by the disaggregation
algorithms. Therefore, it is safe to state that increas-
ing the sampling period can help privacy preservation.
However, sampling less frequently is against the very
idea of smart metering. Therefore, although its effect
on privacy should always be taken into consideration,
downsampling itself is not an acceptable solution for
ensuring privacy in smart resource metering.
E. Load Shaping
Load shaping methods use rechargeable batteries,
renewable energy sources, and shiftable appliances to
erase the appliance signatures from the metered load
as much as possible. The downsides of these methods
are the initial monetary costs of household batteries
and renewable energy sources in addition to consumer
discomfort due to the shifting of appliances’ operation
windows. The analogue of load shaping for the water
and natural gas metering can be achieved by using water
tanks as well as by shifting some of the water and gas
consuming events (such as hot water and heating), which
is not required to be on-demand, to other time slots.
Of all aforementioned privacy preservation techniques,
load shaping methods are, arguably, the most promising,
as they hide the appliance signatures from any actors
from outside the house, while still enabling accurate and
frequent meter readings. However, there are a number
of appliances that use more than one resource at a
time, and all of these resources can be metered in
a privacy-threatening frequency. Therefore, no matter
which techniques are used, all the metered resources
used in a household should be taken into account while
considering privacy. In the next section, we define the
concept of holistic privacy and provide a case study
showing why such an approach is necessary.
IV. HOLISTIC PRIVACY
Privacy preservation schemes designed for electricity
utilization can be adopted to hide electricity, water, and
natural gas signatures individually. However, as there is
a plurality of appliances which simultaneously consume
more than one of these smart metered resources, a
holistic privacy notion which incorporates all of the
smart metered resources simultaneously is necessary (see
Fig. 3). We call this approach holistic privacy.
Even if the electricity usage data of the household
is completely hidden, metered water and gas data can
still be used to infer appliance profiles. For example,
assume that a load shaping method is employed for
hiding only electricity signatures of multiple resource
consuming appliances. As the operation schedule of the
appliances are changed, their usage of gas and water
is also shifted along with their electricity usage because
these resources are used interdependently by those appli-
ances. Therefore, when trying to find the optimal privacy
preserving scheduling for those appliances, one should
consider electricity, water, gas, and any other resource
that is subject to smart metering, holistically. Appliances
that are especially vulnerable to this privacy threat are the
ones that use considerable amounts of multiple resources
5Fig. 3. Hiding only electricity data is not sufficient if water and gas
are also metered frequently.
simultaneously. Combi boilers (electricity, water and
gas), HVAC (electricity and gas), and WMs/dishwashers
(electricity and water) are among such appliances.
Fig. 4. Minutely metered (aggregate) power, water and gas usage
of the household along with the individual electric, water, and gas
usage of the HVAC and the WM.
Since the research on smart multiple resource metering
is relatively new, there are only a few available datasets
which include HTG electricity, water, and gas meter data.
One useful dataset is the Ampds2 dataset [14], where
electricity, water, and natural gas consumption data of a
house in Canada from 2012 to 2014 are available. This
study also provides consumption data for some of the
individual appliances. Therefore, it is possible to observe
an individual appliance’s power/water/gas signatures on
the cumulative load of the household.
For demonstration purposes, we focus on two multiple
resource consuming appliances of the house: the HVAC
unit and the WM. The HVAC has a furnace that runs
on natural gas and an electric furnace fan that blows the
hot air into the house. The WM uses both electricity and
water for its operation. Sample consumption data of the
appliances, as well as the measurement data of the smart
electricity (power), water, and natural gas meters of the
house are plotted in Fig. 4. We analyze three privacy
preservation cases in the rest of this section.
A. Case 0: No Load Shaping
The information on HVAC and WM usage revealed by
the metered power, water, and gas data is obvious to even
the naked eye (see Fig. 4). Also, it can be observed that
the electricity and gas usages of the HVAC are highly
correlated. Mutual Information (MI) is a metric utilized
for measuring information leak in smart metered data
in the literature [4]. In fact, the higher the MI between
two time series, the more information they reveal on
one another. The MI between HVAC power and metered
power is 1.91 bits, whereas the MI between HVAC gas
and metered gas is 1.61 bits. Similarly, the correlation
between the electricity and water usage of the WM can
be observed in Fig. 4. The MI between WM water usage
and metered water data is 0.59 bits, whereas the MI
between power usage of the WM and metered power
is 0.56 bits.
B. Case 1: Privacy by Shaping Electricity Only
We use the mathematical programming framework
presented in [4] to shape the electrical load to hide
the appliance signatures. We utilize the Best Effort
(BE) strategy [15], which is one of the best performing
strategies in terms of privacy [4]. BE strategy minimizes
the difference between metered power usages at adjacent
time slots. Under ideal conditions, BE strategy returns
a metered load that is flat throughout the day. Resulting
electricity, water, and gas usages of the house are plotted
in Fig. 5. The electricity consumed by HVAC and WM
(Fig. 5 - black lines) are completely hidden within the
metered power (Fig. 5 - gray area) with the help of a
2 kWh battery assumed in the formulation. The MI of
HVAC power and WM power are reduced to 0.23 bits
and 0.03 bits, respectively. However, the gas usage of the
HVAC and water usage of the WM can still be inferred
from the overall metered gas and water data (Fig. 5 -
red and blue areas, respectively). The zoomed section
in Fig. 5 reveals the details of the metered water and
WM’s water usage. The MI between HVAC gas data
and metered gas data remains high at 1.82 bits, while
the MI between WM water data and metered water data
is 0.49 bits.
6Fig. 5. Metered electricity, water, and gas usage along with individual
HVAC and WM usages when only electrical signatures are hidden.
C. Case 2: Holistic Privacy by Shaping Electricity,
Water, and Gas Simultaneously
We extend the formulation in [4] to utilize BE strat-
egy for all three resources and make all three metered
data as flat as possible. We assume there is a water
tank (analogous to the household battery) which can be
filled/emptied as desired to shape the water demand. We
do not assume the existence of a gas tank due to its
questionable safety. It can be observed in Fig. 6 that the
gas usage of the HVAC and water usage of the WM
(see the zoomed panel in Fig. 6 for a detailed view) can
be hidden more effectively along with their power usage,
with a small compromise from the flatness of the metered
electricity in comparison to Case 1. The MI values of the
HVAC are 0.49 bits and 0.58 bits for electricity and gas,
respectively. For the WM, the MI values are 0.17 and
0.01 bits for electricity and water, respectively.
Note that in Case 2 the electricity is hidden better
(with almost no appliance signature) compared to water
and gas, which leak more information. The reason for
this is the difference in total number of amenities that
could be used to shape each resource. In the Ampds2
dataset, there are more than 10 electrical appliances that
can be exploited for load shaping as well as a household
battery which can be used to flatten the load. In the case
of water, there are 4 appliances and a water tank to be
employed for load shaping. However, the household has
4 gas consuming appliances, yet, individual data for only
one of them (HVAC furnace) is available and there is no
gas storage assumed in the household. Thus, the optimal
results show a well hidden electrical load compared to
water and gas.
Another interesting point is that shaping all smart
Fig. 6. Metered electricity, water, and gas usage along with HVAC
and WM signatures with a holistic privacy approach.
metered resources (Case 2) will incur a certain cost and
discomfort to the consumer when compared with no load
shaping (Case 0). However, the increase in the cost and
discomfort in Case 2 is comparable with Case 1, which
indicates that the implementation of the holistic privacy
strategy is as practical and feasible as the traditional,
electricity-only privacy techniques.
The case study we presented demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of the holistic privacy preservation in hid-
ing appliance signatures for all metered resources. As
the number of datasets with multiple smart metered
resources increases, more detailed analysis can be made
not only on the load shaping methods, but on all the
other privacy preserving techniques as well.
D. Internet Connection and Privacy
The Internet is another resource which is becoming
almost as available in households as electricity, water and
gas. Although the amount of household Internet traffic
is not directly relatable to appliance usage, it requires
special attention as the Internet traffic can itself be used
to infer some private information and help detecting
some of the IoT devices. By sniffing the cable modem
or the access point, an adversary can deduce private
information about the household such as the number of
residents (e.g., from MAC – Medium Access Control
– addresses) and the vacancy of the house (e.g., from
HTTP – Hypertext Hypertext Transfer Protocol – traffic).
Furthermore, by analyzing the Internet protocols used in
the household, some of the smart IoT appliances that use
a specific type of such protocols can be identified.
Due to aforementioned reasons, a holistic privacy
approach should also cover the Internet traffic of the
7household. Possible countermeasures include using var-
ious spoofing techniques to generate fake traffic to hide
the real Internet usage and mitigate the effectiveness of
adversarial actions. We are leaving the details of imple-
menting such a method as a future research direction.
V. CONCLUSION
The current trends and evolution of smart water and
gas metering is somewhat similar to the early deploy-
ments of smart electricity meters almost a decade ago.
Basic operation principles of NIALM methods designed
to infer appliance usages from metered aggregate elec-
tricity data can also be employed on HTG metered water
and natural gas data with certain adaptations which raises
privacy concerns for water and gas metering. In this
study, we review the advances in smart water and natural
gas metering, NIALM techniques for disaggregating
these resources, and privacy protection strategies for
HTG electricity metering as well as possible adaptations
of these methods to HTG water and gas metering. We
propose the novel notion of holistic privacy for house-
holds that are equipped with HTG electricity, water,
and gas meters. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
the holistic privacy preserving approach by analyzing
the performance of load shaping on the Ampds2 dataset
for electricity, water, and gas simultaneously. We hope
that this study fosters future research on holistic privacy
preservation for the next generation smart homes.
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